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CASE NOTES
intendment of respondeat superior, rather than to subserve the ends of
formal logic.
Jeffrey Cole
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DRAFT CARD BURNING-SYMBOLIC
EXPRESSION NOT IN PUBLIC INTEREST
On October 15, 1965, the appellant, David Miller, burned his draft
card while giving a speech at a street rally near the Army Building in
Manhattan. The appellant believed the burning of his Notice of Classifica-
tion to be a symbolic protest against the draft, the military action in Viet-
nam, and the law prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft
cards.1 The trial court convicted Miller for knowingly destroying a Se-
lective Services Notice of Classification. The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the public interest pro-
tected by the proper functioning of the Selective Service System, a pur-
pose served by statute making it unlawful to mutilate or destroy a draft
card, outweighs any alleged abridgement of freedom of symbolic expres-
sion of speech by a registrant's burning of his draft card. Miller v. United
States, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, No. 851, U.S., February 13,
1967.
The Miller case is significant because it is the first case to interpret the
1965 amendment of section 12(b) (3) of the Universal Military Service
and Training Act which prohibits the knowing mutilation or destruction
of draft cards. The purpose of this note is to analyze the constitutionality
of the amendment in light of the guarantees of freedom of expression as
embraced by the first amendment. In this analysis, the purpose of the
amendment and the character of the act of destroying a draft card as
symbolic speech will be discussed. It will then be possible to consider
whether Congress may, under the pretense of its power to raise and sup-
port armies suppress a form of dissent hostile toward national policy.
It was contended by the appellant that section 12(b) (3) of the Uni-
versal Military Service and Training Act, as amended in 1965, under which
he was convicted, was unconstitutional. The reasons posited for the alleged
unconstitutionality were: (1) that the statute is unconstitutional on its
face because its legislative history establishes that it was enacted deliberately,
and for the purpose of suppressing dissent; (2) it is unconstitutional as ap-
I Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12 (b) (3), 62 Stat. 604 (1948), 50
U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (3) (1965). "Any person ... (3) who forges, alters or knowingly
destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate or any
notation duly and validly inscribed thereon . . . (6) [shall], upon conviction, be fined
not to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years or both."
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
plied to the facts in the case at bar because the appellant's conduct sought to
be punished was symbolic speech protected by the first amendment; and
(3) under the fifth amendment, the 1965 amendment is unconstitutional
because it serves no rational legislative purpose. These issues will be de-
veloped in the order in which they were raised.
The first contention is that the statute in question is unconstitutional
because an examination of the collective legislative intent would reveal
that the statute was enacted for the sole purpose of suppressing dissent.
The appellant's interpretation of the legislative purpose is not without
some justification. The sponsor of the 1965 amendment, the Honorable
Mr. Mendal Rivers of South Carolina, had stated before Congress: "The
purpose of the bill is clear. ...It is a straightforward clear answer to
those who would make a mockery of our efforts in South Vietnam by
engaging in mass destruction of draftcards .... [11f it can be proved that
a person knowingly destroyed or mutilated his draft card, he can be
sent to prison where he belongs. This is the least we can do for our men
in South Vietnam fighting to preserve freedom, while a vocal minority
in this country thumb their noses at their own Government."'2 Clearly,
the motivation for the enactment of the amendment was prompted by
prior burnings of draft cards occurring during demonstrations against the
policy in Vietnam, and its purpose was, as suggested, to suppress this
particular form of dissent. However, it was held in a recent case, that
although adoption of a law was prompted by the conduct and action
of the defendants in that case, it was constitutional and not stricken as
discriminatory or invalid because of its motivation. 3
The holding in that case was not novel. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly stated: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate ...which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are constitutional. ' 4 More succinctly put, this means inquiry into
"hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power consti-
tutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts."-, There-
fore, as long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power,
2 111 CONG. REc. 19135 (daily ed., Aug. 10, 1965).
3People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dism1issed 375
U.S. 42 (1963). The case involved a bizarre display of offensive objects on a clothes
line in a residential area to protest high property taxes. Subsequently, the City of Rye
enacted an ordinance which, in effect, prohibited clothes lines in a front or side yard
abutting a street. The defendant was convicted for violation of the ordinance and the
New York Court of Appeals said: "It is a fair inference that adoption of the ordinance
before us was prompted by the conduct and action of the defendants but we deem it
clear that, if the law would otherwise be held constitutional, it will not be stricken as
discriminatory or invalid because of motivation." (ld. at 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 736).
4 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 320 (1819).
5 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
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"the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of motives which
spurred the exercise of that power."'6 The remedy for an abuse of power,
as may be indicated in the instant case "lies, not in the abuse by the judicial
authority of its functions, but in the people, upon whom, after all, under
our institutions, reliance must be placed for the correction of abuses
committed in the exercise of a lawful power."7 The cases in accord are
legion.8
It is apparent then, that judicial inquiry is at an end, provided that
Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate in a field, so long
as the statute in question does not infringe a constitutional right on its
face. Under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Congress is given the
power to "raise and support armies." The Universal Military Service and
Training Act and its 1965 amendment are clearly embraced by this power.
There is no question presented, however, as to whether Congress has the
power to conscript an army.9
If the first argument is to have any meritorious weight, it must rest
upon the collateral contention that the statute is not narrowly drawn on
its face, and consequently discriminates between card burning as protest
and some other purpose unrelated to symbolic speech. The argument
here also fails. The duty to keep on one's person selective service certifi-
cates is an issue settled many years ago and it is not contended that this
requirement was directed at suppressing dissent. 10 The 1965 amendment
punishing one who wilfully and knowingly mutilates or destroys his
draft card is a natural corollary to the regulation requiring the registrant
to have in his possession his registration certificate at all times, since one
who destroys his draft card cannot have it in his possession." If the Con-
gressional motives are not argued for the applicable statute concerning
6 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959).
7 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904).
s Sonzinsky v. United States, supra note 5. See also Barenblatt v.. United States,
supra note 6; United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953), allegation that improper
motive was revealed in legislative history; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377
(1951); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
9 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See also Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948) wherein the Court stated: "The constitutionality of the con-
scription of man power for military service is beyond question."
10 United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823
(1951), registrant claimed that religious belief motivated him not to carry his registra-
tion certificate.
11 Under the authority delegated to him by Congress in the Universal Military Serv-
ice and Training Act § 10(b) (1), supra note 1, the President promulgated a regula-
tion requiring those who have been classified by a local board to have in their possession
at all times the Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) except when entering
upon active duty into the Armed Forces, when it must be surrendered. 32 C.F.R.
§ 1623.5 (1962). Violation of this regulation was made a felony by § 12(b) (6) of tile
same Act.
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wilful nonpossession, there would seem to be even less justification for
examining the Congressional motives for the 1965 amendment. Therefore,
if any constitutional infirmity is to be found, it is not on the face of the
1965 amendment.
The second argument is that the statute, as applied in the instant case,
is an unconstitutional suppression of speech. The predication of the argu-
ment is that the burning of the draft card, taking into consideration the
attendant circumstances, was a form of symbolic speech. Such acts as
picketing, 12 civil rights sit-ins,13 and flag salutes14 have been held to be
symbolic speech and embraced by the protection of the first amendment.
However, the first amendment does not protect all forms of symbolic
speech.' 5 In the case at bar, the court did not reach a judicial determina-
tion as to whether the conduct complained of was a protected exercise of
free speech, but assumed it arguendo so as to determine whether there
were grounds for its regulation. The appellant agreed that protected free
speech might be regulated, but insisted that the test to be applied was
the clear and present danger test expounded in Schenk v. United States. 6
It was properly found that the appellant was errant in his insistence upon
the clear and present danger test, as the more recent decisions of the
Supreme Court have indicated that a balancing of interest test is the bet-
ter approach to determine the constitutionality of legislation which in-
directly restricts free speech. The balancing test which governs is best
stated as:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the
duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests de-
mands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. 17
12 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
13 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-02 (1961). Accord, Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
14 Vest Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), wherein it
was held that a compulsory flag salute was symbolic speech and to require the salute
would be a violation of the first amendment right to refrain from expression.
15 In Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), it
was recognized that free speech protection does not extend to picketing intertwined
with acts of violence.
16249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The test is: "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree."
17 American Communications Ass'n., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950), wherein
the court held that the statute requiring union officials to file a non-communist affidavit
as a condition of using the services of the National Labor Relations Board was not
violative of the first amendment.
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The more recent decisions of the Court are in accord and require its
application where a narrowly drawn statute regulates conduct on its face,
and not the communication of ideas.' It may be stated, then, that general
regulatory statutes which are not intended to control the content of
speech, but which incidentally limit its unfettered exercise, are not re-
garded as the types of laws the first amendment prohibited Congress to
pass, provided that the law in question has been found justified by sub-
ordinating valid governmental interests; a prerequisite to constitutionality
which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest
involved.
The balancing test being ascertained as the proper approach, the in-
quiry must now necessarily turn to the determination of the government
interest involved and the effect of the 1965 amendment on freedom of
expression. The public interest involved is the proper functioning of the
Selective Service System, and the orderly operation of the draft is ad-
mittedly an interest requiring protection, even when that interest is in
conflict with first amendment liberties.19 In attempting to ascertain how
the statute facilitates the end desired-the orderly functioning of the Se-
lective Service System-the weakest argument defending the constitution-
ality of the 1965 amendment is advanced. It is argued, inter alia, that by
requiring one to have the Notice of Classification in his possession at all
times and by proscribing its mutilation or destruction, it will assist in detect-
ing those registrants attempting to evade their Selective Service obligation;
that in case of a national emergency and "call-up", the registrant could
expeditiously provide proof of his fitness at any local draft board; that
notice of classification can assist a local draft board to reconstruct files
destroyed by fire or other disaster;20 and that the information on the card
facilitates communication with the registrant's local draft board. The
last reason posited, and the most effective, is that the proper functioning
of the Selective Service System depends upon the aggregated consequences
of individual acts. It may be argued that the burning of a few draft cards,
perhaps even a few hundred, will not impair the orderly operation of the
Selective Service System, but the fallacy is apparent. As the Supreme
Court stated in Wickard v. Filburn, a case involving the regulation of
18 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Communist Party of
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961). See also Baren-
blatt v. United States, supra note 6, at 126-27; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461
(1958); United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
19 See United States v. Kime, supra note 10; United States v. Mohammed, 288 F.2d
236, 244 (7th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); United States v. Miller, 233
F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
201Forkosch, Draft Card Burning-Effectuation and Constitutionality of the 196Y
Amendment, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 303 (1966).
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wheat production by way of the commerce clause, "That [appellant's] own
contribution ...may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.' 21
Hence, the assumption is that the conduct complained of here may po-
tentially become multiplied manifold, ,and if so, the orderly functioning
of the draft is bound to be impeded. However, the court was reluctant
to illuminate on how the system would be actually impaired if the sight
of dissident students burning their Notice of Classification becomes as
common as the automobile, leaving the contemplation of the consequences
to conjecture.
To rebut the arguments advanced, it is significant to note that a regis-
trant is no more prone to forget his classification than his telephone num-
ber, and the address of his local draft board may be readily found in the
telephone directory. The Selective Service number assigned to the regis-
trant may be found on his certificate of registration (which is required
in all correspondence with the draft board) as well as the number as-
signed to his draft board by which it is identified. In the event of a national
emergency, the authorities can rapidly ascertain the status of a registrant
through his local board. What would be the effect, then, of appellant's
conduct, if multiplied manifold, upon a public interest which the govern-
ment has a right to protect? The answer is probably to be found, initially
at least, in the political arena relating to respect for the "System". If such
respect is lacking, it could foreseeably touch upon the harmonious, effi-
cient and effective operation of the draft. If registrants have no inhibitions
to publicly destroy their draft cards, an illegal act, it may be opined that
more serious violations of the laws relating to the draft are encouraged
and that this conduct may be severely detrimental to the morale of the
fighting men in the armed forces who are engaged in the present grotesque
realities of war. While an argument such as this is manifestly weak in
judicial precedent, its notion is not altogether without recognition from
the Bar. As Justice Holmes noted in the unanimous opinion in Scbenk v.
United States:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right.22
This principle is no less applicable to conduct offered as symbolic speech
than it is to the uttered word. It would appear, then, that the government
has a legitimate interest involved under article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution.
22" Supra note 16, at 52.21 317 U.S. 111, 12 7-2 8 (1942).
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Against the reasons posited for establishing a legitimate public interest
which the 1965 amendment serves, it now remains to weigh the effect of
the statute upon the freedom of expression allegedly encroached. At the
outset, it should be recalled that the statute is narrowly drawn and regu-
lates a limited form of conduct, whether or not that conduct is intended
as an expression of speech. Notwithstanding the destruction of draft cards,
the statute in no way prohibits speech, communicated in any manner
desired, dissenting to the draft, the law itself or to the military action in
which this country is currently involved. It is claimed that the burning
of draft cards is more dramatic and effective than mere speech, and that
one has a right to the most effective means of communication. Upon
examination of the minor premise of this syllogism, it is found pregnant
with fallacy. Certainly one may not blow up the Statue of Liberty or
the Washington Monument because it most effectively expresses a dis-
approval of a law or policy. It may be argued, however, that these are
violent acts or expressions, which the burning of draft cards is not. This
distinction also has its limitations. In Kovacs v. Cooper,23 the court af-
firmed a conviction under an ordinance forbidding the use on public
streets of sound trucks or any other instrument which emitted "loud
and raucous" noise against a claim that the statute unconstitutionally
abridged freedom of speech.24 The Kovacs and instant case are similar
in that there was no restriction placed upon the communication of ideas,
but merely a partial restriction on the methods which may be used to
communicate them. This, of course, does not imply that availability of
other means of communication justifies a suppression of any one of them,
but that where symbolic speech is involved, it is a relevant consideration.
At this point it may be safely concluded that freedom of speech is not
absolute in that it must prevail when the constitutional protection exists,2 5
and also that protected rights are not confined to verbal expression. For
example, the right of freedom of speech embraces "appropriate types of
action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly man-
ner to protest by silent and reproachful presence." 26 If the 1965 amend-
ment proscribed a form of pure speech, there might be a stronger argu-
ment for its unconstitutionality, but pure speech and conduct offered
symbolically as speech are not treated as the same nor entitled to the
same liberties under the first amendment. It was held in Cox v. Louisiana"
that the first amendment does not afford the same kind of freedom to
those who would communicate ideas by conduct, such as marching and
picketing on streets and highways, as the amendment affords to those
23 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
24 Ibid. 26 Supra note 13.
25 Supra note 18. 27 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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who communicate by pure speech.2 8 This reasoning was predicated upon
the declaration in Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.2 9 in which it
was explained that "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written or printed. '30 It will be recalled that the
appellant burned his draft card while giving a speech at a street rally,
and it appears from the facts in the instant case that it is within the
scope of the principle enunicated in Giboney.
The final argument asserted is that the statute does not serve any ra-
tional legislative purpose and is therefore an unconstitutional deprivation
of individual liberty without due process of law under the fifth amend-
ment. Some have urged that it would have been wiser for Congress to
have placed a service charge for obtaining a new card when one burned
or otherwise intentionally mutilated his original. It is argued that a rea-
sonable service charge would have put the same act in its proper per-
spective and probably fewer burnings would have happened.3 1 It is also
pointed out that the 1965 Amendment has been called "a silly law" in a
national periodical with extensive circulation..3 2 While it may in fact be
proven, in retrospect, that the statute is unwise, it is not the province
of the judiciary to so determine; for on this point, judicial inquiry is at
an end when it is ascertained that Congress has the power to enact the
statute.
Thus, it is seen in Miller v. United States that the 1965 Amendment to
section 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Services and Training Act
of 1948 is not unconstitutional. The court held that it was not the function
of the judiciary to go behind the statute to glean the collective legislative
motive or to pass judgment upon the wisdom of the enactment. Even
assuming, arguendo, that the burning of the draft card is symbolic speech,
"it is the effective and efficient operation of the Selective Service System,
not the .. .right to use this particular form of communication which is
entitled to the protection of the law."33 This conclusion is reached by ap-
plying the balancing test as expounded in American Communications
Ass'n., CIO v. Douds 4 which permits regulation in the interest of public
order where the regulation results in an indirect and minimal abridgement
of speech, and where the former demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented. It may be that the amendment to
28 Id. at 555. 29 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 30 Id. at 502.
31 Rachlin, Draft Cards and Burning the Constitution, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 334
(1966).
32 Wainright, A Serious To-Do About a Silly Law, Life, March 4, 1966, p. 17.
33 United States v. Smith, 249 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
34 Supra note 17.
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section 12 (b) (3) will prove silly and unwise, and demonstrate itself to
be the product of passion which seeks to suppress the voice of dissent.
But the Miller case made it manifestly clear that redress will not be found
in the courts. If any relief from the allegedly oppressive law is to be
forthcoming it will be through the process of the ballot box and the
pressures of public opinion.
Alan Sobel
CRIMINAL LAW-CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE
TO PUBLIC INTOXICATION STATUTE
Defendant, Easter, was accused of violating a criminal public intoxica-
tion statute in the District of Columbia.' His defense was chronic alcohol-
ism, and he presented evidence that he had been consuming alcoholic bev-
erages intemperately for over thirty years and had been previously ar-
rested for the same offense approximately seventy times. Easter was found
guilty in the trial court, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 2 The United States Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that chronic alcoholism, though not amounting to
insanity, is a defense to the crime of public intoxication. Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The ruling that chronic alcoholism is a defense to the crime of public
intoxication represents a change from the still prevailing common law
which does not recognize chronic alcoholism not amounting to insanity as
a defense. The only other jurisdiction which has adopted this view is the
Fourth Circuit in the case of Driver v. Hinnant,3 a habeas corpus proceed-
ing involving the same issues. It will be the purpose of this note to trace the
development of intoxication as a defense to the crime of public intoxication
and to analyze the reasoning followed by the court in breaking with the
common law and the overwhelming majority of states. This paper will not
attempt to explore the legal ramifications of the possibility of extending the
defense.
Intoxication as a defense to a crime may be divided into three areas: (1)
involuntary intoxication, (2) voluntary intoxication and (3) chronic alco-
holism. Involuntary intoxication has long been recognized, even at com-
mon law, as a defense to a crime.4 It has repeatedly been held that where
one becomes intoxicated without his consent, through the force or fraud
I D.C. CODE ANN. 25-128 (1961). "(a) No... person shall [in the District of Columbia]
be drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley, park, or parking."
2 Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. Ct, App. 1965).
3 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
4 Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882); Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 250 (1854);
Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 169, 197 Pac. 1060 (1921).
